LIGNex1 GLOBAL REPORT

Czech aircraft succeed in Korea. Bristell planes will be used for training by the Korean Air Force

The Czech company BRM AERO from Kunovice has succeeded in a demanding tender and was selected by the Korean acquisition agency DAPA to supply its Bristell training aircraft for the initial training of pilots of the Korean Air Force. The multi‑year contract for 2026–2028 covers not only the aircraft themselves, but also flight simulators, spare parts, ground equipment, and comprehensive technical support, including the development of local infrastructure in the Republic of Korea.

The Korean defence industry is experiencing dynamic growth driven by record weapons exports. According to estimates by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (abbr. SIPRI), in 2020–2024 it accounted for 2.2% of global exports of major arms systems and ranked 10th worldwide, while aiming to become the fourth‑largest exporter by 2030. According to estimates by the Korea Defence Industry Association (abbr. KDIA), in 2024 the size of the domestic defence market amounted to approximately USD 18.3 billion, a year‑on‑year increase of roughly 32.6% compared with 2023. The country’s defence budget for 2026 is USD 45.1 billion. Owing to this strong focus on the defence segment, opportunities for cooperation are opening up for foreign partners—and Czech companies in particular—in a number of areas. These include, for example, the supply of firearms, mobile platforms, radar systems, as well as equipment and gear for security and emergency services. Recently, the Korean side has also indicated strong interest in joint development of new technologies, joint‑venture projects either in the Czech Republic, in Korea, or in third markets, and the inclusion of Czech firms in supply chains as subcontractors.

Founded in 2009, BRM AERO manufactures light sport and general aviation aircraft with modern avionics and FAA and EASA certifications at its Kunovice plant. With the support of the Czech Embassy in Korea, the company entered the tender conducted by the Korean Defense Acquisition Program Administration (abbr. DAPA). It succeeded by passing demanding flight tests and technical evaluations, in which the Bristell B23‑915 IFR convinced evaluators with its combination of Garmin modern avionics and the Rotax 915iSc engine. As part of the project, BRM AERO will also develop local infrastructure together with partners Hansung Industrial and Kyungwoon University to ensure the readiness and long‑term sustainability of the fleet.

“Selection by DAPA proves that BRM AERO meets strict operational and quality standards. We see this as a long‑term programme with strong local support and a clear commitment to maintaining the fleet for decades,” said Martin Bříštěla, CEO and co‑founder of the company. “This contract is not only about delivering aircraft. It is about delivering a complete training solution and its long‑term support. Bristell platforms are successfully used by flight schools and operators worldwide, and this programme significantly strengthens our presence in the Asia‑Pacific region,” added Martin Berka, the company’s Director of Business Development.

Suppliers of death: The Insider identifies another 300 companies making purchases on behalf of the Russian military

The United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom face two main difficulties when imposing sanctions aimed at disrupting Russia’s military production. First, it is not always clear which goods are being imported specifically for military use. Second, when one company is sanctioned, a substitute soon appears in its place, and while new Western restrictions are being introduced, the Russian military-industrial complex has time to adapt. But there is a way to solve this problem. After studying data on domestic supplies and comparing them with customs data, The Insider has identified more than 300 companies that make purchases specifically for the Kremlin’s military-industrial complex. If these were all to be added to sanctions lists at the same time, it could deal a serious blow to Russia’s military production efforts.

How the suppliers were identified

Enterprises in Russia’s defense industry rarely import products themselves. As a rule, they rely on intermediaries to purchase raw materials, blanks, machines, equipment, and spare parts. These are mostly small and mid-sized companies that are fully owned by private individuals — unlike defense firms, where the state traditionally holds a significant or controlling stake.

Such structures can more easily bypass bureaucratic hurdles, and they often have the funds and risk aversion necessary to overcome Russian customs barriers using informal means. The market-driven nature of this sector, combined with intense competition, is one of the main reasons for the resilience of Russia’s defense industry.

The Insider regularly reports on specific intermediary operations (individual Greek smugglers or German factories, for example) and on the structure of this foreign-trade intermediary market. Reporting has been done both in individual sectors, such as deliveries of Taiwanese machine tools, and more broadly, taking a wider look at shipments from Europe in a range of spheres.

The chain of transactions that can be traced from the foreign manufacturer to the Russian buyer typically stops once an imported good reaches Russia. After that, only indirect evidence can lead to the conclusion that the goods have ultimately ended up at a military production facility. This often becomes clear only after the fact, when Western components are found in the remains of missiles and drones used to attack Ukraine.

Debris from the Russian Kh-101 cruise missile with American components

However, new investigative methods have finally allowed The Insider to reconstruct these chains on a large scale.

Using data on domestic-market transactions (which, in the interests of the investigation, The Insider is not disclosing) and comparing them with customs records, The Insider was able to analyze which foreign-trade participants struck deals in 2024 with leading enterprises in Russia’s military-industrial complex. Using this method, we were able to identify around 160 key firms.

The 160 companies selected are an important part of the defense-industrial complex, but the actual number of intermediaries is far larger. The Insider’s analysis so far covers only the tip of the iceberg and marks only the beginning of the investigation.

Customs data show that in 2024 about 10,000 Russian companies imported sanctioned products worth more than $22 billion. More than 2,000 of those companies were contractors for leading defense-industry enterprises. According to data obtained by The Insider, those contractors made direct deliveries to major military-industrial firms worth more than 80 billion rubles, or about $1 billion.

The total value of sanctioned goods imported into Russia by defense-industry contractors exceeded $5 billion — a tally that includes only shipments with a value of $20,000 or more. (Not all of those products necessarily ended up in the military-industrial complex, however, as a significant share is also in demand in the civilian sector.)

Deliveries also often do not take the most direct route, instead moving through a network of intermediaries. Among the leading defense-industry enterprises examined by The Insider, only around half deal directly with importers of sanctioned goods.

Irreplaceable

A significant portion of sanctioned components cannot be replaced with analogues, and their absence would cause critical problems for Russia’s defense industry.

For example, Japanese SMC Corporation laser plasma chemical etching equipment is in demand in the field of domestic electronics that are manufactured in Zelenograd (just outside Moscow) and installed in military products. In 2024, Kontrakt Holding imported such a system for the well-known Russian microchip manufacturer Mikron, an army supplier that is under sanctions. Microchips are needed in virtually all modern weapons.

In addition, FPGAs, which serve as the “brains” of any system whose navigation is based on terrain recognition, are vital for military equipment. As such, they are used in a number of modifications of Russian Geran drones. The company Uniserv LLC imported Xilinx FPGAs into Russia in 2024, supplying such goods to the drone manufacturer STC LLC (ООО «СТЦ»), which is under sanctions.

Geran drones require Xilinx FPGAs

Measuring machine sensors are used in the military industry for the precision manufacturing of parts. Such sensors from the British company Renishaw, whose products are the global market leaders in terms of quality, were imported in 2024 by Intratool LLC (ООО «ГК «Интратул»), which traded with the sanctioned engine manufacturer PJSC UEC Saturn (ПАО «ОДК Сатурн»).

The tip of the import iceberg

Even a single transaction between an importer of sanctioned goods and a military plant is already a red flag that calls for closer scrutiny. In order to weed out very small transactions, The Insider selected from the list of importers that serve as counterparties to leading defense enterprises, evaluating only those that supplied military plants with goods worth more than 1 million rubles (around $13,000). More than 300 such importers were identified. Their transactions with leading defense plants totaled 11 billion rubles ($142.3 million), while their overall imports totaled about $2 billion.

For example, imports by Rustakt, a manufacturer of drones and importer of lithium-ion batteries for drones, amounted to 30 billion rubles ($388.2 million). Deals with the defense industry that The Insider was able to confirm totaled 13 million rubles ($168,000).

A number of companies import milling and turning machines, some of which are supplied to the military-industrial complex. Among them are Mir Stanochnika, iMachine Technology, AMG, Promservice, and the Baltic Industrial Company. The Insider has previously reported on some of them, establishing their cooperation with the defense sector.

It is clear that it is the enterprises of Russia’s military-industrial complex that are now most in need of an upgrade to their metalworking machine tool fleet. The Insider was able to confirm only a limited number of deals. However, given the real needs of the sector, there are likely to be many more.

It is the enterprises of the Russian military-industrial complex that are now most in need of an upgrade to their metalworking machine tool fleets.

High-precision oscilloscopes and signal generators are in demand for electronic warfare devices. They are supplied by the Dipaul group (as detailed here). According to information obtained by The Insider, Dipaul is a regular supplier to the military-industrial complex.

Old-timers, giants, contractors, and speculators

Importers that trade with Russia’s defense industry can be divided into four groups.

The first includes manufacturers that buy sanctioned goods directly, without intermediaries. These are fully or partly state-owned, long-established defense industry plants that both conduct foreign trade and produce items that are later sold inside Russia’s own defense sector.

Specific companies falling in the first group include KRET, UEC, the Ural Optical-Mechanical Plant, the United Instrument-Making Corporation, and the Kazan Helicopter Plant. However, companies that engage in both foreign trade and military-industrial production are largely an exception. In general, defense enterprises do not deal with foreign suppliers directly. (Bureaucracy at large factories, along with international sanctions, make such arrangements difficult.)

Due to bureaucracy and sanctions, enterprises of the Russian military-industrial complex enterprises rarely conduct business with foreign countries directly.

The second group of buyers of sanctioned parts consists of industrial giants that produce bulk commodities such as steel, pig iron, aluminum, and petroleum products. For the defense industry, these producers are critical; however, the defense industry is not critical for them, as they will have plenty of civilian buyers, a list that includes builders, road construction contractors, mining companies, and automakers.

Many companies of the second group are not under sanctions — this despite their scale and economic importance to Putin’s Russia. That appears to be a deliberate policy by Western powers, which would lose more from higher prices for the goods produced by these giants than they would gain from reducing the volume of their operations.

The third group includes contractors or “adjacent” suppliers — i.e. companies in Russia that produce important individual units, blocks, or assemblies for the defense industry but depend heavily on imports of raw materials and components. This is the most interesting group of private importers doing business with the defense sector. Examples of such companies and their products, listed in descending order of their trade volume with the defense industry, can be found in the table below.

These adjacent suppliers are mostly private businesses that are flexible enough to import the parts and components they need on their own. At the same time, they take risks when they go to foreign markets as they understand they could become “visible.” If they are hit with sanctions, they would have to look for intermediaries to handle foreign trade. Given that they typically boast hundreds of employees, complex property holdings, and an array of licenses and certificates, these firms cannot simply shut down and reopen from scratch.

Finally, the fourth — and largest — group of importers consists of reseller firms. These classic intermediaries are typically private limited-liability companies with a small number of employees. They specialize in wholesale trade in a fairly narrow sector, for example metalworking, electronics, or measuring tools.

Among resellers, there are a few large retail chains whose customers include individuals and companies in the civilian sector while also fielding orders from the defense industry.

The biggest group of resellers are suppliers of metalworking machine tools and the spare parts for such units. In addition to the machine-tool firms already mentioned above, top resellers include Unimatic, Ameka, Promarsenal, Rosmark-Stal, Soyuz Engineering, Ipr Oborudovanie, MT Machinery, STS Technology, Grant-Trade, and Inkor.

Resellers of electronics, circuit boards, microchips, radio parts, connectors, telecom equipment, and industrial automation systems are less visible, in part because Russian customs officials began concealing data on some electronic components starting in 2024.

These include Trimiks, Uniservis, Radiofid Systems, and Bi Pitron. This category features both suppliers of finished foreign products (mainly Chinese-made) and firms that take orders in Russia to manufacture electronics to a Russian company’s specifications.

Some resellers, such as Bi Pitron, also produce their own products, as was described by company representative Vasily Malyshev at Russia’s Army 2024 forum. According to Malyshev, Bi Pitron has developed an import-substituting optical signal converter for the military. (Nevertheless, any claims that “all” elements of the communications line are made from Russian components raise serious doubts.)

Of particular interest are companies whose import turnover roughly matches their turnover from deals with the defense industry. Bi Pitron, which uses shell firms in Indonesia to supply wires and cables, is one of them. A near one-to-one ratio between imports and deal turnover, as well as the near total absence of these firms in the public space (typically they have no offline stores and no clear websites with catalogs) suggests that they are little more than shell companies for military plants.

Western countries have only added a portion of the largest reseller-importers (by volume of deals with the defense industry) to their sanctions lists. Medium and small resellers (again in terms of their deal volume with the defense sector) are mostly not under sanctions at all.

Resellers import not only Chinese equipment. The leading “Western” brand still finding its way into Russia has been Japan’s Tsugami, which makes machine tools. Taiwan, South Korea, and Switzerland are also leading country-of-origin suppliers.

Indonesia selects M-346 as its next trainer and light combat aircraft

Leonardo’s M-346 could join the Indonesian Air Force in the future, serving as an advanced jet trainer/lead-in fighter trainer, as well as a light combat aircraft.

On 4 February, at the Singapore Airshow, Leonardo announced the signing of a letter of intent with PT ESystem Solutions Indonesia and the country’s Ministry of Defence for the supply and support of M-346F Block 20 aircraft.

The announcement stated that the parties will now advance to the next stage of discussions, which are aimed at finalising a procurement contract.

No purchase quantity was disclosed. While early reports suggested discussions for 18 aircraft, a 3 February report by Intelligence Online – citing documents it had reviewed – stated the deal covers 24 aircraft with an option for an additional twelve.

In a visit to Leonardo’s facilities in Italy in July last year, Air Chief Marshal Mohamad Tonny Harjono, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, had inspected the M-346 production line.

An Indonesian Air Force statement accompanying the visit noted that “this advanced jet trainer platform is one of the references in strengthening the fighter pilot education programme, as well as developing operational readiness”.

If followed through, Indonesia will become the second country in Asia-Pacific to acquire the M-346 aircraft. The first was Singapore, which operates twelve aircraft from Cazaux Air Base, France as part of its Advanced Jet Training Detachment.

The M-346 Block 20 is offered in two variants: the dedicated trainer “T” model and the “F” version, which combines training and light fighter capabilities. Notably, Indonesia has opted for the M-346F, likely to meet its advanced trainer needs while addressing its fighter shortfall across a sprawling archipelago with multiple security hotspots.

The M-346F Block 20 is the latest evolution of the trainer, first unveiled in 2024. It features a large area display cockpit, an active electronically scanned array radar, Link 16 data link, electronic countermeasures and new weapon systems. These all enhance its capabilities as a light combat aircraft.

The M-346 also leverages a mature integrated advanced flight training system, featuring a ground-based training system that utilises live, virtual and constructive training.

It is also worth noting that Indonesia had at one stage considered the M-346 to replace its elderly BAE Systems Hawk 53 trainers. In the event, the Korea Aerospace Industries T-50i was selected, with 16 ordered in 2011 and a further six in 2021. Three T-50i aircraft have been involved in accidents over the years.

The potential M-346F Block 20 order would allow Indonesia to replace its fleet of BAE Hawk 109/209 trainers and light attack aircraft that have been in service since the 1990s.

Early last month, the Indonesian Air Force’s 12th Air Squadron retired the type as it transitions to the Dassault Rafale fighter, leaving the 1st Air Squadron as the only unit still operating the Hawk.

The first three Rafales arrived at Roesmin Nurjadin Air Force Base in Pekanbaru, Riau on 23 January.

U.S. Army Approves $73.5M Merkava Power Pack Deal to Sustain Israel’s Tank Fleet Through 2032.

The U.S. Army has awarded a $73.5 million Foreign Military Sales contract to Rolls-Royce Solutions America Inc. to supply Merkava tank power-pack kits and engineering support for Israel through 2032. The deal reinforces long-term armored readiness by sustaining the 1,500-horsepower propulsion modules that underpin Israel’s frontline heavy combat fleet.

The U.S. Army’s latest Foreign Military Sales action for Israel quietly signals something bigger than a spare-parts purchase. On February 17, 2026, a notice released by the U.S. Department of War showed Rolls-Royce Solutions America Inc. awarded a $73,528,916 firm-fixed-price contract for Merkava Power Pack Less Transmission full and lite kits, metal containers, and contractor engineering technical services, with work centered in Graniteville, South Carolina, and scheduled through December 31, 2032. Framed inside a broader cumulative program value of $462,947,478 and managed by Army Contracting Command at Detroit Arsenal under contract W912CH-26-C-0019, the award points to a long-horizon sustainment pipeline designed to keep Israel’s heavy armor fleet moving, not a one-time replenishment.

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A $73,5 million U.S. Foreign Military Sale contract will supply Rolls-Royce-built Merkava power-pack kits and engineering support through 2032, strengthening Israel’s ability to keep its frontline tanks and heavy armored fleet mission-ready by sustaining the 1,500 hp-class propulsion modules that underpin Merkava mobility, survivability, and high-tempo armored operations (Picture source: Israel MoD).

For Israel’s heavy tracked fleet, propulsion is the pacing item that determines how many tanks are available on short notice, how long they can remain forward, and how quickly battle damage can be repaired. In late January, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible $740 million sale to Israel for Namer Armored Personnel Carrier APC-MT883 power packs, less transmissions in full and lite configurations, plus tools, diagnostics, publications, containers, technical assistance, and non-recurring engineering. The February 17 Army award closely mirrors that construct, but applied to the Merkava ecosystem, suggesting a synchronized effort to keep both the tank and its heavy armored companion vehicles moving through the same logistics throat.

A power pack is more than an engine in a crate: in modern armored design, it is a modular drop-in module built around a high-power diesel, cooling group, filtration, wiring, sensors, and ancillaries, engineered to be swapped as a unit to compress downtime from days to hours. The MT883-class V12 diesel frequently associated with the Merkava Mk4 and Namer propulsion family sits in the 1,500-horsepower category, and U.S. Army testing literature describes the MT883 Ka-500 as a turbocharged V12 delivering 1,500 hp, built for military adaptability and sustained heavy loads. That matters tactically because it underwrites acceleration, obstacle negotiation, and the ability to pivot from slow, deliberate urban movement to high-tempo maneuver in open terrain without immediately punishing the drivetrain.

The contract’s split between full and lite kits points to two different sustainment rhythms. Full kits typically align with depot-level resets and major overhauls, while lite kits are optimized for field maintenance, rapid replacement of high-wear components, and configuration standardization across sub-variants. The inclusion of metal containers is not a footnote: containers enable prepositioning, corrosion control, and predictable transport, turning expensive propulsion modules into managed inventory that can be surged to a brigade repair area or a rear logistics hub as operational tempo spikes. Rolls-Royce’s Graniteville site in South Carolina offers the geographic anchor for that pipeline.

Zooming out, the engine only matters because the Merkava itself is designed around a very Israeli set of battlefield assumptions. The Merkava family prioritizes crew survivability and the brutal realities of close terrain. Its front-engine layout adds mass between the crew and frontal threats, while enabling a rear compartment and ramp that can be used for emergency evacuation, resupply under armor, or carrying a small number of dismounts in specific missions. In tactical terms, this gives Israeli armored formations unusual flexibility in dense urban fights, where tanks frequently operate in tight coordination with infantry, engineers, and drones, and where the ability to recover wounded under fire can influence tempo and morale as much as a few extra millimeters of armor.

Firepower and protection remain the core. The Merkava Mk4 lineage centers on a 120 mm smoothbore gun for armored engagements and fortified positions, backed by a suite of secondary weapons suited to suppressing anti-tank teams at close range, including an internal mortar concept that is particularly relevant in urban canyons where high-angle effects are needed without calling for indirect fire. Protection is layered, combining heavy passive armor with active protection such as the Trophy system, whose sensor and countermeasure architecture has become a defining feature of Israel’s approach to defeating modern anti-armor threats before impact.

The newest modernization narrative reinforces why propulsion sustainment is being treated as strategic plumbing rather than routine spares. In an official Israel Defense Forces profile of the Merkava Mk4 Barak, an Armored Corps official highlights AI-enabled mission management, updated sensors, and a helmet system intended to let crews see the outside environment from inside the combat vehicle, while also pointing to logistical improvements enabling missions up to 30 percent longer than current ones. Endurance gains of that kind are only real if the fleet can keep power packs healthy and available, and if maintenance organizations can cycle engines through reset without starving frontline units.

Institutionally, the Merkava is not merely a platform; it is the armored backbone around which the Israeli Ground Forces have organized their heaviest combined-arms formations for decades. Israel’s Ministry of Defense notes that the Merkava and Armored Vehicles Directorate is responsible for the design, development, and production of Israel’s tanks and for building the supporting industrial ecosystem. That ecosystem is often cited as a pillar of wartime resilience: Israel can modify protection packages, integrate new sensors, and adapt tactics quickly because so much of the engineering authority is domestic.

And yet, this contract is a reminder that even the most national tank is not entirely national. The Merkava Mk4 powertrain is widely linked to a pairing of the GD883 or MT883 diesel with a Renk RK 325-class automatic transmission. The February 17 award is explicitly less transmission, which implies parallel sourcing and separate sustainment tracks for the gearbox and related components.

That division of labor carries geopolitical weight. Assembling or producing key tank propulsion elements outside Israel is a tangible expression of deep, confident state-to-state relationships, particularly when executed through U.S. Foreign Military Sales channels that bind financing, contracting oversight, and delivery mechanisms into a single framework. The benefit is resilience through scale: Israel taps a mature industrial base and a structured pipeline that can outlast short-term budget turbulence. The risk is dependence: export controls, political friction, or supply chain shocks can ripple straight into armored readiness. In practice, Israel appears to be hedging. It keeps design authority, protection philosophy, and much of the integration at home, while outsourcing a critical but modular subsystem that can be stocked, containerized, and rotated through a controlled sustainment loop. The 2032 horizon in the Army award suggests both sides expect the Merkava family to remain a frontline instrument for years, and they are investing accordingly in the unglamorous component that decides whether a tank is a symbol in a parade or a weapon that actually rolls when the call comes.

UK Renews Push for Saudi Arabia to Invest in Fighter Jet Program

Takeaways by Bloomberg AIHide

• The UK is renewing a push for Saudi Arabia to invest in its next-generation fighter jet program alongside Italy and Japan, as costs spiral and a rival project stalls.
• The UK Defence Secretary says he and his counterparts in Rome and Tokyo are “developing any discussions with potential partners together” and that the terms for Saudi Arabia to join the Global Combat Air Programme have been set out.
• Saudi Arabia’s potential involvement in the program could provide a desired cash injection, but its ability to become a full member may be complicated by an existing work-share agreement between Leonardo, BAE, and Japan Aircraft Industrial Enhancement.

The UK is renewing a push for Saudi Arabia to invest in its next-generation fighter jet program alongside Italy and Japan, as costs spiral and a rival project stalls.

A flurry of diplomatic activity this month saw Prince William and defense minister Luke Pollard both visit Riyadh amid the effort for Saudi Arabia to join the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) in some capacity. UK Defence Secretary John Healey told Bloomberg that he and his counterparts in Rome and Tokyo are “developing any discussions with potential partners together.”

“We’ve set out the terms in which Saudi could become involved with GCAP,” Healey told Bloomberg in an interview last week during the Munich Security Conference, while emphasizing his immediate focus is advancing the program. “We’re driving this program forward: the Saudis have their own decisions to make.”

Talks for Saudi Arabia to join the program had been building pace over a year ago, but were held up due to opposition from Japan. That country’s new leadership — Sanae Takaichi took over as prime minister in October and won elections this month — is more amenable to Saudi involvement.

Britain’s fresh diplomatic push comes as manufacturers and allies grow frustrated with the Labour administration’s delay in publishing a plan to allocate fresh defense funding. Though GCAP is expected to be handed billions of pounds in the plan, the delay has led to uncertainty around its ability to finance key contracts.

The Italian government has been particularly irked by the UK’s failure so far to commit to a helicopter contract for Leonardo, one of the companies involved in GCAP, according to people familiar with the matter, who spoke on condition of anonymity in order to voice internal concerns.

The expected price of the project has also ballooned: Italy now expects early-phase costs to reach €18.6 billion ($22 billion), compared to around €6 billion at 2021 prices when the program was first drawn up, Reuters reported. Multinational defense programs are often beset by spiraling costs and delays, though the GCAP program has been steadily progressing. The Italian parliament approved almost €9 billion of funding for the project last week.

Saudi Arabia could provide a desired cash injection into the program: the UK’s defense committee last year said expanding GCAP “could bring benefits including burden-sharing of costs, access to additional markets, and technical expertise.”

Still, an equal 33.3% work-share in the project between Leonardo, BAE and Japan Aircraft Industrial Enhancement has already been agreed, which is likely to complicate Saudi Arabia’s ability to become a full member of the program.

The Middle Eastern nation is interested in joining the program, one of the people said, though cautioned that its desire could be lessened as a result of a recent deal to acquire advanced F-35 fighter jets from the US. Saudi Arabia last year was designated a major non-NATO ally of the US, alongside Israel, Qatar and Egypt, as part of a broader agreement to strengthen military cooperation.

No new decisions have been taken trilaterally between Britain, Italy and Japan regarding additional countries joining the program, one of the people said.

The UK has long been supportive of the Saudi Arabia joining the project to build a sixth-generation stealth fighter for service from 2035 but the other two partners have been more skeptical about letting the Middle Eastern nation enter critical supply chains and access high-end technology, according to people familiar with the matter.

Japan has been most wary due to national security and intellectual property concerns, they said, with Italy more convinced by the partnership. But as Tokyo looks to start retiring its aging fleet of F-2 fighter jets from 2035, it has become more open to Saudi participation if it helps keep the program on track and doesn’t dilute the work-share for Japanese companies.

“GCAP is a strategically important project that links the Indo-Pacific and the Euro-Atlantic regions, and it is extremely important to accelerate this project,” Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi said at the recent Munich Security Conference. He and Healey discussed the project in the German city last week.

Italian premier Giorgia Meloni also discussed ways to speed up investment in the program last month when she visited Japan, some of the people said. Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani has said that he was open to potential expansion.

The Italian government declined to comment. Saudi Arabia didn’t respond to a request for comment. A spokesperson for the UK’s defense ministry said all three nations have “highlighted an openness to working with other nations.”

The GCAP program has made progress in the last year, with a headquarters and joint venture between the three companies established and more than 6,000 engineers working on the project. BAE Chief Executive Officer Charles Woodburn told reporters on Wednesday that though the project is “moving fast,” he’s eager for Britain’s investment plan to be published so they can “crack on with it.”

“This is a program that is substantial, with momentum, and that’s the main focus,” Healey told Bloomberg. He’s said the government is working at speed to publish the plan. It’s expected as soon as next month.

GCAP’s progress comes in contrast to a rival fighter jet program between France, Germany and Spain which has stalled due to squabbles between Paris and Berlin on who should lead. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius insisted that it’s “not dead yet” but most observers expect it to be dramatically scaled back, fueling speculation that Germany may also want to join GCAP.

Healey didn’t rule that out when asked by reporters in Munich, saying: “Germany and France will make their own decisions and then we’ll see where we are.”

Venezuela operation relied on little-known cyber center, official says

SAN DIEGO — A little-known joint center for integrating cyber operations proved instrumental during the operation to capture Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro, a top Navy cyber official said this week.

Speaking at the WEST 2026 conference, Vice Adm. Heidi Berg, commander of Fleet Cyber Command/10th Fleet, compared the Joint Integrated Fire Center (JIFC) to a cyber version of a combined air operations center, an organizing cell that coordinates effects in an area of operations. The organization encompasses all the headquarters elements and teams for cyber operations — as well as space counterparts, intelligence community and interagency — to help build out an understanding of cyber fires and work with kinetic and maneuver forces to layer those in at the timing and tempo of the commander.

But the way the JIFC was used during Operation Absolute Resolve “validated” the construct, thanks to “very precision layered fires that also supported maneuver,” she said in public comments during the WEST 2026 conference in San Diego.

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“It was large and complex and precise and it validated much of what we had talked about, but it also talked about the absolute criticality of the precise delivery of cyber and space fires integrated in with SIGINT,” Berg told conference attendees during a presentation. “And in fact, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, ‘we will never execute operations as we had previously, we will always see cyber, space and SIGINT at the forefront of how we execute operations.’”

The New York Times reported that CYBERCOM took action to turn the lights out in Venezuela, interfered with air defense radars, and disrupted hand-held radios signifying fuller integration into operations.

There are various types of cyber organizations and forces conducting operations around the globe. For example:

• Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber: These entities are commanded by the heads of the service cyber components and are assigned particular combatant commands to provide planning, targeting, intelligence, synchronization, and command and control of cyber capabilities. They command combat mission teams, that conduct cyber operations on behalf of combatant commands mostly in the offensive sphere, and combat support teams, that provide intelligence, mission planning and other necessary support work for combat mission team.
• Cyber National Mission Force: a sub-unified command under CYBERCOM charged with defending the nation from significant cyber threats. These are high-end cyber warriors made up of 39 joint teams organized into task forces aligned against specific nation state threat actors.
• DOD Cyber Defense Command: Formerly Joint Force Headquarters-DOD Information Networks, it is responsible for conducting defensive cyber operations on the network across the globe.

The concept of a JIFC was created about three years ago and stemmed from an unnamed tier one exercise, Berg, the Navy’s top cyber warrior who took command late last year, said in an interview with Breaking Defense on the sidelines of the conference.

A spokesperson later told Breaking Defense that the JIFC used for the Venezuela op was modeled off one managed by Fleet Cyber for Indo-Pacific Command. Under the Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber, Fleet Cyber heads cyber operations for INDOPACOM, SOUTHCOM and US Forces Korea.

The JIFC is not a standing body like the Cyber Operations-Integrated Planning Elements that are essentially forward extensions of the JFHQ-Cs in the combatant command staff to help plan cyber effects. Rather, it is stood up for an exercise or a named operation or for planning purposes if an operation is likely to take place.

Berg noted that the JIFC provides a single place for the customer to go for requirements and pull in capabilities from all three of the above groups. This is critical as there could be several forces operating in a particular area. For example, Berg is responsible for cyber operations in SOUTHCOM with combat mission teams. There could also be CNMF teams operating against certain actors there as well as cyber support to SOCOM activity from JFHQ-C Marines or defensive activity from DCDC.

All those cyber forces “had to come through the JIFC, which allowed us to really understand and really it was helpful for the customer too. They had one place to go for requirements. They had one place to go for what do you got in the toolkit, as we dig in the bag, and we could do this,” she told Breaking Defense. “That allowed us to, again, through the execution, to understand better about the layering and how we might want to continue to adjust how we layer those fires, and then how we do that execution.”

Berg called it a “game changing” capability that has significantly evolved since it’s inception, noting, “There’s no, like, stray voltage out there that that you got to clean up on aisle six. We’ve got a construct that enables all that integration,” she told conference attendees.

However, there is still work to do to improve the integration and coordination. For example, while the JIFC has proven effective, it is still complicated and depends on the quality of the people to integrate it. Similarly, it is not a standing body that can direct, but rather an integration and synchronization organization. Thus, they need to continue to develop relationships over time.

They are also working to pull more of the defensive operations in as well.

“I don’t think we quite have it right yet to represent the full ecosystem, whereas it’s good at offensive fires, I really need to bring in the entirety of the defensive ecosystem, to include secure, operate and defend,” she said. “When an adversary is targeting us, how do I not just build out the resilience and whatever protective measures that we have to put into place for a fleet to continue to operate, but then also, how do I design targeting packages to be able to target that particular adversary and their infrastructure to take out and continue their attacks? Instead of just building our wall higher to defend against arrows, how are we also rapidly going after the archers and going after the arrow factory?”

What Can Cyber Do For You

Berg said it’s imperative in 2026 they accelerate the integration of space and cyber into other domains. The JIFC was the result of an exercise where there were two key things missing: integration with supported commands and the understanding of what cyber can do for those commands.

“Educating the customer base is another one that will allow us to, I think, better employ,” she said. “A lot of times they’ll understand, ‘Hey, I heard there’s a capability that does x’ as opposed to ‘I need y done,’ and that allows us to be able to think through, ‘Okay, if you want y done, here’s a way that we could accomplish it.’”

Berg noted that each combatant command is integrating these effects at a different pace and understanding their speed as well as how letting them know how cyber can support is paramount.

For example, she explained cyber tools can be employed in a more nuanced way than traditional capabilities.

“Whether it is a warning shot that you can execute in a less visible way, or it is the opportunity to execute a cyber fire that then can act as a deterrent, because it doesn’t demand the same level of response as a kinetic fire,” she said.

Berg pointed to how at the kickoff of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Russia took action in cyberspace that affected tens of thousands of European users, but did not trigger NATO’s Article V collective defense response that would likely be the result of a kinetic fire.

“This is a much more nuanced tool for, again, escalation dynamics that we haven’t quite been able to master yet,” she said.

Northrop not seeking direct DoD investment for solid rocket motors, but suppliers might: CEO

WASHINGTON — Northrop Grumman’s chief executive said today that the company has no plans to follow L3Harris’ lead to allow the Pentagon to take a financial stake in its solid rocket motors business, but hinted that some of its key suppliers may enter into similar investment agreements with the department.

“We certainly work in the supply chain to ensure that our suppliers also have the resources they need. And in some of those cases, there may be an interest for those companies to take investment directly from the government,” Northrop CEO Kathy Warden told investors during Citi’s Global Industrial Tech & Mobility Conference. “We’re facilitating those conversations with the [Pentagon’s] Office of Strategic Capital.”

In January, the Defense Department announced it would invest $1 billion into L3Harris’ missile solutions business, which the company would spin off as a separate publicly-held company. The deal enables the department to take an ownership stake in the new company, although it will not be on the board of directors or involved with managing the business.

GA-ASI is advancing the new era of collaborative combat aircraft. Learn How >>

For Northrop’s own solid rocket motor business, however, Warden stated that the company remains the “best party” to continue making the investments needed to scale up motor production, with no such spin off necessary.

“We have not entertained any discussion with the government to make that investment, and certainly no discussion about equity in our company or the model that has been utilized and communicated by L3Harris,” she said.

One key reason for that, she said, is the interplay between solid rocket motors and the company’s strategic missiles business — a separate division of Northrop that includes programs like the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile program, which use solid rocket motors.

“There’s just a lot of strategic synergy in those parts of our portfolio that we want to maintain ownership structure of,” she said. “But just because we as a large company see that strategic synergy across the portfolio and are choosing one model doesn’t mean that other companies won’t choose a different model.”

Not just selling into the kingdom, but building partnership with Saudi Arabia’s defense industry

Consolidation of the defense industrial base during the 1990s and 2000s left the Pentagon with only two domestic suppliers of solid rocket motors — L3Harris and Northrop — and despite a wave of up-and-coming providers like Anduril and Ursa Major, the sector still routinely struggles with long lead times and supply chain challenges.

When asked in January whether the Pentagon’s stake in the L3Harris missile solutions business could lead to a competitive disadvantage for other solid rocket motor providers, Michael Duffey, the Pentagon’s top acquisition and sustainment official, said the ability to provide a return to the taxpayer was the driving force in L3Harris deal.

“We’ve had a pattern within the defense industry of writing checks from the Department of War on behalf of the taxpayer to expand the industrial base with no promise of return,” he said. “This is a direct change to that.”

So far, L3Harris is the only defense prime that has agreed to spin off a portion of its business with the Pentagon taking an ownership stake. L3Harris, which will remain the majority shareholder of the new missile solutions company,  plans to move forward with initial public offering (IPO) of that division in the second half of 2026.

During a later session at the Citi conference, Lockheed CEO Jim Taiclet had strong words when asked whether he had considered a financial arrangement similar to L3Harris’ spin-off agreement while brokering deals with the Pentagon to increase PAC-3 and THAAD interceptor production.

“We did not consider any kind of structure like L3Harris,” said Taiclet, adding that regulators had previously rebuffed Lockheed’s proposed purchase of solid rocket motor maker Aerojet Rocketdyne in 2022 before allowing L3Harris to acquire it.

“They [L3Harris] didn’t have, I guess, apparently, the resource to manage the scaling themselves. We do, and if we would have had [Aerojet Rocketdyne] inside of our company, we would just be doing it,” he said. “We have the scale and scope and the financial wherewithal to do exactly what we’re talking about, to deliver that growth path with internal investment and our own balance sheet, our own cash flow. And so we’re committing to do that without having to joint venture, spin off, sell off part of the company.”

X-68A LongShot Air-To-Air Missile-Carrying Drone Moves Closer To F-15 Launch

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General Atomics’ air-launched LongShot drone has made new progress toward its first flight with the completion of various tests on the ground, including a demonstration of its weapons release capabilities. LongShot, now also designated the X-68A, is set to be carried aloft first by an F-15 fighter. The goal of the program has been to explore how an uncrewed aircraft capable of firing air-to-air missiles could extend the reach and reduce the vulnerability of the launch platform, among other benefits.

The U.S. military’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) released new details about the LongShot program, which it is leading, today. A “multitude of U.S. government stakeholders” have also been involved, including elements of the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, U.S. Army, and NASA, according to DARPA.

General Atomics, as well as Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman, received initial contracts to work on competing concepts for the drone in 2020. DARPA chose General Atomics’ design for continued development in 2023. The original hope had been that the uncewed aircraft would make its maiden flight before the end of that year. The current goal is to begin flight testing before the end of the year.

“DARPA’s LongShot with General Atomics Aeronautical Systems has successfully completed a series of technical milestones, moving its air-launched uninhabited vehicle – recently designated the X-68A – closer to flight testing,” according to DARPA’s release. “Recent achievements, including full-scale wind tunnel tests and successful trials of the vehicle’s parachute recovery and weapons-release systems, demonstrate significant progress in developing this next-generation capability.”

Previously released renderings of LongShot have depicted it as capable of releasing at least one AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) from an internal bay running along the bottom of the fuselage.

The overall LongShot design that has been shown to date is akin to that of a cruise missile, with an elongated fuselage and a chined nose. It has reverse-swept main wings toward the rear of the fuselage and small canards at the front, both of which pop out into their deployed positions after launch. It also has an inverted V-shaped twin-tail configuration and a vertical strake that sticks up just slightly from behind the top-mounted dorsal engine air intake.

The official entry for the X-68A in the U.S. Mission-Design-Series (MDS) designation system says that the drone is powered by a single Williams WJ38-15 turbojet, according to the Designation-Systems.net website. The use of the WJ38-15 may point to a high subsonic top speed for LongShot. This engine is also used on the German-Swedish Taurus KEPD 350 air-launched cruise missile, a 3,000-pound-class design with a stated maximum speed of Mach 0.95.

It is also worth noting that LongShot’s parachute recovery is intended, at least at present, for use in testing and training, rather than any actual combat employment of the drone.

“LongShot is intended for conflict. In combat scenarios, recovery isn’t really practical, and the price point doesn’t make it necessary,” C. Mark Brinkley, a General Atomics spokesperson, told TWZ last year. “However, for test and training, it is recoverable, and we have options for that.”

As mentioned, the first live test launch of a LongShot drone is set to be from an F-15 fighter, an aircraft type particularly well known for its ability to carry outsized payloads. F-15 variants have already been used in the United States, as well as in Japan, as aerial launch platforms for jet-powered drones. For years now, TWZ has been highlighting the particular potential of the Air Force’s new F-15EX Eagle II to carry oversized payloads and act as airborne drone controllers.

DARPA and General Atomics have also talked about the potential to launch X-68As from bombers’ internal bays, as well as from cargo aircraft using the Rapid Dragon palletized munitions system.

“LongShot is intended to extend the range at which a launch platform can fire on targets, which, in turn, helps keep them further away from threats. The drones can fly forward into higher-risk areas before launching their own missiles. As designed, LongShots also simply expand the total area in which a launch platform, especially a tactical jet like an F-15, can engage threats.”

“LongShot drones could also leverage targeting data from sources other than their launch platforms. This would rely on, but also take immense advantage of long-range ‘kill web’ architectures in development now. As those kill webs expand in scale and scope, the likelihood of munitions engaging targets outside the range of a launch platform’s organic sensors will only grow. You can read more about these developments here.”

These capabilities could be further magnified by bomber or cargo aircraft carrying larger numbers of LongShot drones. Larger launch platforms could saturate a particular section of the battlespace with air-to-air assets quickly, enabling the rapid deployment of a temporary counter-air screen. The uncrewed aircraft could also provide more localized defense for larger and more vulnerable aircraft, and they would only have to be deployed as necessary in that role. That, in turn, would help reduce strain on escorting assets.

The LongShot program has so far been described in terms of scenarios that center more on direct control for the launch platform. However, control of the drones after launch could similarly be localized or executed across longer distances via beyond-line-of-sight datalink capability and/or signal relays. This could also allow for control to be handed off from one node to another. Higher degrees of autonomy would allow for the performance of tasks after launch with fewer direct human inputs, as well.

“We’ve got a program right now with DARPA that we’re working on. It’s called LongShot. And that effort is really, if you think about, it’s about an air-launched fighter,” Patrick “Mike” Shortsleeve, Vice President of DoD Strategic Development for General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc (GA-ASI), told TWZ‘s Jamie Hunter in an interview at the Air & Space Forces Association’s 2025 Air, Space, and Cyber Conference last September. “So, we’re talking about a smaller UAS [uncrewed aerial system], … but it also will be able to carry air-to-air missiles and be brought into the fight in mass when needed. So LongShot represents sort of another iteration of what we’re doing for disruption, to help the Air Force change or revolutionize the way air dominance is being done.”

There are still questions about how efficient it would be in real combat to use an expendable drone like LongShot to get missiles closer to potential engagement areas, as well as offer some loitering capability. What the cost equation might be, in particular, compared to using more advanced, reusable drones and/or longer-ranged missiles, is unclear. Still, the Air Force and/or other services could see LongShot as a necessity for meeting certain operational needs that cannot be addressed by any other solution.

As we have highlighted in the past, LongShot could feed into other uncrewed aircraft efforts, especially separate, but intertwined Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) programs now being run by the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Navy. In an interview with Breaking Defense last year, David Alexander, President of General Atomics’ Aeronautical Systems, Inc., division (GA-ASI), said that LongShot could be a “great fit” for Increment 2 of the Air Force’s CCA program. General Atomics and Anduril are already developing separate drone designs, designated the YFQ-42A and YFQ-44A, respectively, under Increment 1 of that program. The Marines are also now set to utilize the YFQ-42A design at least as a surrogate for a future CCA capability.

When it comes to LongShot, DARPA says that “ground and integration testing currently underway” is now steadily building up to “the safe and effective employment of the X-68A from an F-15, confirm the flight worthiness of the LongShot vehicle, and demonstrate its ability to safely eject a captive sub-munition” after years of schedule slips.